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The impact on welfare and public finances of job 
loss in industrial Britain
Christina Beatty  and Steve Fothergill 
INTRODUCTION
Most discussion about the UK economy tends to be framed within short time-horizons, with elections 
or at most changes in government setting the outer edges of memory and debate. his may convey 
immediacy and relevance but the efect is all too often to obscure the longer-term issues and trends.
In the United Kingdom, the deining feature of the economy over the last 30 or 40 years 
has been the big shift away from industry as an employer and generator of wealth. hat this 
‘deindustrialization’ has happened is widely understood. Yet the massive consequences for the 
contemporary economy and for present-day policy-making are generally overlooked. his is 
unfortunate because major economic changes, such as deindustrialization, have impacts that spill 
over from decade to decade.
his article begins to build the links between the loss of Britain’s industrial base and the UK’s 
present-day public inances. To do so, the article draws on the authors’ own empirical research 
over the last three decades. he individual components of this research have been published 
elsewhere so the full details are not repeated here. However, by combining all of the pieces an 
overall picture becomes clear. he article’s novel contribution is to build the links between job 
loss, welfare spending and present-day austerity, and to do so by taking a long-term perspective.
ABSTRACT
It is important to take a long view of many economic problems. This article explains how the large-scale 
loss of industrial jobs in parts of Britain during the 1980s and 1990s still inflates the contemporary budget 
deficit in the United Kingdom. Drawing on the findings of several empirical studies by the authors, the 
article shows that although there has been progress in regeneration the consequences of job loss in Brit-
ain’s older industrial areas have been near-permanently higher levels of worklessness, especially incapacity 
benefits, low pay, and a major claim on present-day public finances to pay for both in-work and out- 
of-work benefits. Furthermore, as the UK government implements reductions in welfare spending the 
poorest places are being hit hardest. In effect, communities in older industrial Britain now face punish-
ment in the form of welfare cuts for the destruction previously wrought to their industrial base.
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In brief, the argument is that the destruction of industrial jobs, which was so marked in Britain 
in the 1980s and early 1990s but has continued on and of ever since, has fuelled spending on 
welfare beneits which in turn has compounded the budgetary problems of successive governments. 
With the UK government set on welfare reform, the places that bore the brunt of job destruction 
some years ago are now generally facing the biggest reductions in household incomes. here is 
a continuous thread linking what happened to British industry in the 1980s, via the Treasury’s 
budgetary calculations, to what is today happening on the ground in so many of Britain’s hard-
pressed communities.
In particular, these links are explored using local data. his has been the distinctive contribu-
tion of the authors’ research and its value is that it provides not just a level of detail that would 
otherwise be missing but, more importantly, it sheds light on the underlying processes at work. 
he UK Treasury knows it has a problem balancing public inances and that the government 
spends an awful lot on working-age welfare beneits. But it never seems to ask exactly where – 
which towns and cities – draw so heavily on beneits, or why these communities have become so 
reliant on welfare spending.
he focus of the argument and the data we present is distinctively British. However, deindus-
trialization is not unique to the UK. Welfare systems obviously vary from country to country, but 
the rather striking evidence from the UK may ofer important pointers to how, in the long run, 
labour markets and public spending may have adjusted to industrial job loss in other countries too.
BACKGROUND
‘Jobs’ and ‘welfare spending’ are signiicant topics in their own right but in the UK they have 
generally been separate lines of academic inquiry.
Industrial job loss has attracted substantial attention. he major job losses of the early 1980s 
were documented in particular by Townsend (1983) and the process of deindustrialization more 
generally by Martin and Rowthorn (1986). he distinctive geography of the early 1990s recession 
was recorded by Gudgin (1995). By the end of the 1990s it was clear that the job deicits across 
the UK were highly uneven and that they were no longer terribly well relected by unemployment 
data (Erdem & Glyn, 2001; MacKay, 1999; Webster, 2000). he long up-turn in the UK economy 
from 1993 to 2008 then began to generate an element of complacency, and the government quite 
misleadingly began to speak in terms of a return to full employment (HM Treasury, 2003). he 
recession provoked by the 2008 inancial crisis was a wake-up call, prompting a rediscovery of 
the divergent trends between North and South (Gardiner, Martin, Sunley, & Tyler, 2013) and 
between city regions (Centre for Cities, 2016; Martin, Sunley, Tyler, & Gardiner, 2016; Pike 
et al., 2016; Swinney & homas, 2015; Townsend & Champion, 2014).
Debates around welfare have traditionally been the preserve of social policy analysts rather 
than economic geographers so they tend to be concerned less with the impact on places than 
on speciic social groups (see, e.g., Alcock, 2014). ‘Welfare reform’ is not a new concept, but in 
the UK it became a prominent part of the jigsaw following the election of the Conservative-led 
Coalition Government in 2010. Austerity has clear links to welfare reform in that the need to 
curb public spending has been advanced as a key reason for reducing social security beneits (HM 
Treasury, 2010). Welfare reform has generally been explored in terms of its impact across the 
income spectrum, on vulnerable groups or on work incentives (Adams & Browne, 2013; Hirsch 
& Beckhelling, 2011; Hood & Johnson, 2016; Scottish Government, 2013). Webster (2006) is 
an exception in arguing that the efectiveness of welfare reform can only be understood in the 
context of the geography of worklessness.
However, the failure to link industrial job loss, claims on the welfare budget and the impact 
of austerity is in our view a failure to understand the origins of present-day problems.
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THE DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN
To begin to weave the links between jobs, welfare and austerity in the UK it is appropriate to 
start by outlining the scale of industrial job loss and its distinctive geography.
Britain was once a major industrial employer. In 1966, when manufacturing employment 
peaked, 8.9 million worked in manufacturing and a further 500,000 in the coal industry. his 
compares with just 2.9 million employed in manufacturing in 20161 and none at all in the coal 
industry except at a handful of opencast sites and tiny drift mines. he shift from manufactur-
ing to service-sector employment is a phenomenon shared by other advance economies (see 
Rowthorn & Wells, 1987), rooted in diferential rates of productivity growth and accentuated by 
globalization. But in Britain the process of deindustrialization has gone further and faster than 
just about anywhere else.
As Figure 1 shows, UK manufacturing employment fell steeply in the early 1980s in a reces-
sion triggered by a high exchange rate and high interest rates. he recession of the early 1990s 
added further pain. hereafter, manufacturing employment failed to recover even though the UK 
economy enjoyed 15 years of sustained economic growth. As a share of total UK employment, 
manufacturing has now fallen to just below 10%, compared with 30% in the 1960s and around 
25% at the start of the 1980s. For the coal industry (which is not included within ‘manufacturing’), 
the biggest job losses started a little later, after the 1984/85 miners’ strike, but by 1992 two-thirds 
of the pre-strike workforce had gone. he inal colliery closed in 2015.
hese industrial job losses were concentrated in speciic parts of the country – mostly but 
not exclusively in the ‘older industrial areas’ of the North, Scotland and Wales. In many cases 
the economic base of whole communities was destroyed. By contrast, London escaped relatively 
lightly and so did most of its vast hinterland in the South and East of England.
Partly this pattern relected the pre-1980 location of UK manufacturing, and coalmining of 
course only took place where there was coal to be mined. Partly the pattern of job loss relected 
the location of the industries that shrank most – coal, steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, 
textiles and so forth. Also, partly it was attributable to the closure of branch factories in the 
‘assisted areas’ that had opened in the post-war years of economic growth and strong regional 
policy (Fothergill & Guy, 1991).
Figure 1. UK manufacturing employment, 1978–2016. Source: ONS (2017).
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Figure 2 illustrates the geography of this job loss. Manufacturing employment has fallen just 
about everywhere across the UK so this map does not try to show the location of every industrial 
closure or redundancy over the last three and a half decades. Rather, it lags up the biggest or 
most signiicant job losses, where major companies or industries have shrunk to a fraction of their 
former scale or disappeared entirely. Some of the job losses shown here are the result of individual, 
large plant closures, but more often than not (e.g., in the case of the coal and textile industries) 
they relect the run down and closure of employers spread across several neighbouring towns. 
Nevertheless, the concentration in a number of speciic areas is especially noticeable. It is not the 
whole of the North, nor indeed the whole of Scotland or Wales, that has been hard hit. Many rural 
areas, for example, were less afected. Anyone familiar with the UK will recognize that it is mostly 
the industrial cities, towns and coalield areas that sufered the big job losses – central Scotland 
(particularly the Glasgow area), the North East of England, West Cumbria, a large swathe of the 
North West of England and Yorkshire (from Liverpool via Manchester, Leeds, Sheield and their 
surrounding towns across to Hull), parts of the Midlands (including the Notts/Derby coalield, 
the Birmingham area and Stoke-on-Trent) and South Wales including the Valleys.
his distinctive geography of industrial job loss is a pattern that recurs in the evidence on 
welfare spending presented later. Our argument is not that the link is conined to a handful of 
cities or towns but that it characterizes large parts of the North, the Midlands, Scotland and 
Wales afected by industrial job loss. In these places, recovery from job loss has been incomplete 
and welfare spending is far higher as a result.
LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT
he 1980s are remembered in Britain as a period of high unemployment. he number of claim-
ant unemployed – that is, the number out of work claiming unemployment beneits – hovered 
around three million for a number of years, which was perhaps to be expected given the scale 
of the job loss. But after the early 1990s recession, claimant unemployment fell away, declining 
to less than one million for most of the 2000s, and after the 2008 inancial crisis returning to 
below one million once more. If claimant unemployment alone was to be the sole guide, it might 
be argued that the UK economy has got over deindustrialization. Unfortunately, this optimistic 
assessment is wide of the mark. A closer look at how labour markets have adjusted explains why.
he irst clue to what was really happening in older industrial areas came from the coalields. 
By the early 1990s most of the pits had shut but claimant unemployment in the coalields was no 
higher than when the pits had been working. his was not what most observers had expected. We 
therefore picked apart the trends in the coalield labour market (Beatty & Fothergill, 1996). How 
much of the low claimant unemployment could be explained by commuting to neighbouring areas, 
by out-migration or by new job creation? he conclusion, based on Census data, was in fact that 
the main response to coal job loss was a diversion of working-age men into ‘economic inactivity’. 
Looking closer, this was primarily a withdrawal from the labour market into what the Census 
called ‘permanent sickness’ – in practice onto incapacity-related beneits. herefore job loss had 
indeed resulted in a lasting increase in beneit claims but not in the way that had been expected.
In a follow-up study (Beatty, Fothergill, & Powell, 2007) we brought the igures forward by a 
decade or so. A lot more had happened, particularly on the job creation front, but the fundamental 
conclusion remained the same: the large labour market adjustment in response to coal job losses 
was an increase in economic inactivity among working-age men. Furthermore, because many of 
the ex-miners had by then reached state pension age it was clear that the increase in economic 
activity must be occurring much more widely across the local workforce. In efect, job loss for one 
generation was being passed on as higher economic inactivity among the next. By 2008, economic 
inactivity among working-age men in the English and Welsh coalields was still 150,000 higher 
than at the beginning of the 1980s (Beatty, 2016; Foden, Fothergill, & Gore, 2014).
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Figure 2. Major industrial job losses since the early 1980s. Source: Beatty and Fothergil (2016a).
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he coalields pointed the way but it quickly became apparent that their experience was not 
unique. Across the whole of older industrial Britain, from the mid-1980s through to the early 
2000s there was a huge surge in the numbers out of the labour market – ‘economically inactive’ – 
on incapacity-related beneits (Beatty & Fothergill, 2005).
We argued that much of the increase in incapacity numbers was a form of ‘hidden unemploy-
ment’. hese were men and women who in a fully employed economy might have been expected to 
be in work but whose health problems or disabilities entitled them to incapacity-related beneits 
(these days Employment and Support Allowance (ESA)) instead of unemployment beneits. Our 
estimates of the scale of hidden unemployment adjust for underlying variations in the extent of ill 
health. he most recent igures, for 2012 (Beatty, Fothergill, & Gore, 2012), suggest that as many 
as 900,000 unemployed are hidden on incapacity-related beneits, only around 100,000 down on 
our irst estimate for 1997 (Beatty, Fothergill, Gore, & Herrington, 1997).
he increase in incapacity numbers in older industrial Britain occurred among women as well 
as men. At irst this seemed hard to understand because the heavy industries shedding jobs had 
previously mainly employed men. What became apparent, after much detailed research in the 
former coalields and elsewhere, is that these days the male and female sides of the labour mar-
ket interact so that a shortfall in opportunities for men is transmitted, through competition for 
jobs, to a di cult local labour market for women in the same places. Out-of-work women with 
health problems or disabilities generally end up on incapacity-related beneits just like their male 
counterparts (Beatty, 2016; Beatty, Fothergill, Houston, Powell, & Sissons, 2009b).
So via the study of local data it became possible to draw irm conclusions about what really 
happened in response to the large-scale loss of jobs in older industrial Britain: yes, claimant unem-
ployment did fall back to low levels. But the near-permanent efect has been to raise incapacity 
claimant numbers, both among men and women.
THE IMPACT ON PRESENT-DAY WELFARE SPENDING
We can now begin to explore what this has meant for welfare spending and for the UK Treasury’s 
struggle to balance public inances. It is appropriate to begin by looking at the numbers claiming 
the three main out-of-work beneits, shown in Figure 3 for 1979–2016 for Britain as a whole.
As we noted earlier, the numbers claiming unemployment beneits – Jobseeker’s Allowance 
( JSA) from 1996 onwards and Universal Credit more recently – reached three million in the 
mid-1980s, fell back, rose again in the early 1990s and then declined to well under a million. 
In the wake of the 2008 inancial crisis the numbers peaked at around 1.5 million before falling 
back once more.
he number claiming lone-parent beneits – Income Support for most of this period – rose 
from around 300,000 at the start of the 1980s to a peak of around one million in the mid-1990s. 
he evidence on the geography of lone-parent claims (Rowthorn & Webster, 2008) pointed 
clearly to job loss among men as a key factor. In the places where men’s jobs had disappeared, 
such as older industrial Britain, the ability of men to provide inancial support for women and 
children had been eroded. More recently, the numbers for lone-parent beneits have fallen, not 
least because eligibility has gradually been restricted just to those with the very youngest children.
he striking feature in Figure 3, however, is the rise in the numbers out of work on incapac-
ity-related beneits, from around 750,000 to a plateau of around 2.5 million. he numbers have 
declined a little from the all-time high in the early 2000s, but not by much.
Incapacity-related benefits
here are two remarkable aspects of the incapacity numbers. First, they are largely invisible. he 
igures surface in the media from time to time but probably few beyond those who follow these 
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issues would be aware that the numbers currently out of work on incapacity-related beneits 
exceed the numbers on unemployment beneits by more than three to one and that, the imme-
diate post-inancial crisis years excepted, this has been the situation since the end of the 1990s.
he other remarkable aspect of the incapacity numbers is that they have stayed so high for so 
long despite multiple eforts to bring them down. Reform in 1995 introduced more formal medical 
tests. More restrictive eligibility rules were introduced in 1999. A Pathways to Work programme 
for claimants was introduced in 2003. From 2008 onwards ESA replaced the previous incapacity 
beneits, with a new medical test, new conditionality and (from 2012 onwards) an extension of 
means-testing. But all this efort has had remarkably little impact on the headline igures. Clearly, 
the factors that underpin incapacity claimant numbers are very powerful indeed.
he key insight again comes from the local numbers. Figure 4 shows the share of adults of 
working age claiming incapacity-related beneits in February 2016, by district across the whole of 
Britain. It is immediately apparent that there are huge variations across the country. Moreover the 
pattern is systematic. he highest incapacity claimant rates are mostly found in older industrial 
Britain – places such as the South Wales Valleys, North East England, Merseyside and Clydeside. 
In contrast, the incapacity claimant rate in much of the South and East of England, especially 
outside London, is modest.
In fact, 18 of the 20 districts with the highest incapacity claimant rates cover older industrial 
areas.2 Typically, the incapacity claimant rate in older industrial Britain is just above or below 
10%, meaning that one in 10 of all adults between the ages of 16 and 64 in these places are out of 
the labour market on ESA or (in a diminishing number of cases) one of its predecessor beneits. 
In Blaenau Gwent and Neath Port Talbot in South Wales the incapacity claimant rate is 11.9%. 
his rate is also 11.9% in Glasgow. In Liverpool it is 10.8%, in Middlesbrough 10.3% and in 
Stoke-on-Trent 10.1%.
High incapacity claimant rates are emphatically not an issue in the places where the local 
economy is strong. Only one London borough is among the top hundred (Islington at number 
95) and only four other districts in South East England, all of which cover seaside towns.
Of course, older industrial Britain often has higher underlying levels of ill health so we might 
expect to ind higher incapacity claimant rates here. But it is worth remembering that the surge 
in incapacity claimant numbers in these places only happened after the industrial jobs began to 
disappear. When the mines, steelworks and the like still employed vast numbers, far more people 
were actually exposed to damaging impacts on their health but far fewer made incapacity claims.
Figure 3. Working-age benefit claimants, 1979–2016. Source: DWP (2017).
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Figure 4. Incapacity-related benefit claimant rate by district, February 2016. Sources: DWP (2017), 
ONS (2017).
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What appears to be happening is that where there are plenty of jobs, the men and women with 
health problems or disabilities are able to hang on in employment or ind new work if they are 
made redundant. But where the labour market is di cult, as in older industrial Britain, ill health 
or disability ruins many people’s chances of inding and keeping work. Employers are well able to 
recruit the it and healthy instead. Poor qualiications, low-grade work experience and advancing 
years all too often compound the di culties that the sick and disabled experience in inding work.
Additional welfare benefits
his is nevertheless still a long way from attributing more than a small share of the present-day 
iscal constraints on the Treasury to the consequences for the beneits system of industrial job loss. 
To expose the full impact we have to irst consider the other welfare beneits claimed alongside 
incapacity-related beneits.
ESA, onto which nearly all incapacity claimants have been moved, is not overly generous, 
particularly bearing in mind that most claimants spend long periods out of work on this beneit. 
he current (2016/17) basic rates are £109 a week for an ESA claimant aged 25 or over in the 
‘Support Group’ and £102 a week for one in the ‘Work-Related Activity Group’, although the latter 
is now means-tested after 12 months and is soon to be reduced to £73 a week (the same as JSA) 
for new claimants. But in practice many ESA claimants are also entitled to additional beneits, 
depending on their personal and household circumstances. hese beneits include the following:
•  Means-tested top-ups, including for disability.
•  Disability Living Allowance (DLA)/Personal Independence Payments (PIP).
•  Housing Beneit.
•  Child Tax Credits.
•  Council Tax Support.
•  Industrial Injuries Beneit.
•  Free school meals.
Several of these are widely claimed by ESA claimants. At the present time a number of these 
beneits are being merged into Universal Credit, but that does not change the basic point because 
the rules governing entitlement are essentially carried over from the old system.
DLA, which is currently in the process of being replaced by PIP, is worth singling out. his is 
paid to men and women with health problems or disabilities to help ofset the additional costs 
they face. In total, 3.65 million men and women claimed DLA or PIP in February 2016, of whom 
2.25 million were of working age.3
he geography of DLA/PIP claims, shown in Figure 5, is remarkably similar to the geography 
of incapacity (ESA) claims. As we noted in a report for the Department for Work and Pensions in 
2009 (Beatty, Fothergill, & Platts-Fowler, 2009), at that time around half of all incapacity claim-
ants received DLA and around four out of ive working-age DLA claimants received incapacity 
beneits. he report also noted that even in-work DLA claimants were concentrated in the same 
places as incapacity claimants.
It is hardly surprising therefore that older industrial areas account for around three-quarters of 
the districts with the highest DLA/PIP claimant rate. Neath Port Talbot in South Wales heads 
the list, where 11.2% of all 16–64 year olds – one in nine of the working-age population – claim 
DLA or its replacement PIP. In Glasgow this igure is 9.7%, in Liverpool 9.3% and in Barnsley 
in South Yorkshire 8.6%. By contrast, there are relatively few DLA/PIP claimants, either in 
work or out of work, in the most prosperous local economies of southern England. Across much 
of Surrey, for example, the DLA/PIP claimant rate is below 3%. he highest ranked London 
borough (Islington again) comes in at only 5.6% – 161st out of 379 Great Britain (GB) districts.
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Figure 5. Working-age DLA/PIP claimant rate by district, February 2016. Sources: DWP (2017), 
ONS (2017).
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In essence, DLA/PIP appears to function as an addition to ESA for many longer-term incapac-
ity claimants whilst some of those who do return to work then retain their DLA/PIP entitlement, 
which is not dependent on employment status. herefore, just as ESA claims are disproportionately 
concentrated in older industrial areas, DLA/PIP claimants are found disproportionately in older 
industrial areas as well.
It is not easy to assess precisely how much this all costs. he Treasury does not publish overall 
igures but some components can be measured directly and others can be estimated. he DWP’s 
own data tell us that £14.9 billion a year is spent on working-age incapacity-related beneits, 
these days nearly all ESA. To this needs to be added an estimated £7.2 billion a year paid to the 
same claimants in the form of DLA/PIP, £7 billion a year in Housing Beneit and £3.2 billion 
a year in Tax Credits. he grand total for the beneits presented in Table 1 comes to just under 
£34 billion a year.
his is a staggering sum, and one that has previously received little attention. But let us be 
quite clear: we are not arguing that this is inancial support which individuals are not entitled 
to or should not receive. We are simply drawing attention to the total cost to the Exchequer. 
Furthermore, of this immense cost a good proportion – perhaps £10–14 billion a year given the 
distribution of incapacity claimants across the country – could be described as the price of job 
destruction in older industrial Britain.
he cost of higher claimant unemployment in older industrial Britain needs to be added to 
this. he numbers on JSA are far less than those on ESA, as we noted earlier, and some add-on 
beneits such as DLA/PIP are less widely claimed by the claimant unemployed. JSA alone cost 
the Exchequer £2.3 billion in 2015/16, but if we follow broadly the same logic as for incapacity 
claimants (in Table 1) the full cost of claimant unemployment, adding in other beneits, is more 
than £6 billion a year.
Once more, only part of this cost can be attributed to the destruction of jobs in industrial 
Britain and it is worth bearing in mind that there is always some unemployment even in fully 
employed local economies. But if we assume that around half of the claimant unemployment in 
older industrial Britain is rooted in job loss, and bear in mind that these places have rather more 
Table 1. Estimated payments to working-age incapacity claimants, 2015/16.
Notes: 
aDWP data including residual, Incapacity Benefit, Income Support and Severe Disablement Allowance 
payments for incapacity.
bBased on share of working-age DLA/PIP claimants not in work.
cHousing Benefit claimants with ESA.
dBased on number of ESA claimants with children and average payment per out-of-work household.
eSpending for 2012/13 of £1.1 billion on Council Tax Benefit to incapacity claimants, reduced to reflect 
new scheme.
fWorking age only.
gAssumes 500,000 children at £400 per year.
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on DWP.
 £ billion per annum
 ESA (including means-tested top-ups)a 14.9
 DLA/PIPb 7.2
 Housing Benefitc 7.0
 Child Tax Creditd 3.2
 Council Tax Supporte 1.0
 Industrial Injuries Benefitf 0.4
 Free school mealsg 0.2
 
 Total 33.9
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than 40% of all GB unemployment,4 the higher claimant unemployment arising from industrial 
job destruction probably costs the Exchequer another £1–1.5 billion a year.
In-work benefits
he full cost to the Exchequer is greater still, however. One of the deining features of the industrial 
jobs that have been lost on such a grand scale is that they were often relatively high value-added, 
high-wage jobs. he skilled manual jobs in manufacturing are now far fewer in number.
In older industrial Britain there has been job growth in the wake of industrial decline but all 
too often it has been in low-productivity, low-wage activities. In the former coalields, for exam-
ple, two of the prime sources of new jobs have been call centres and warehouses. he Yorkshire, 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalields, for instance, have a central location and ready access 
to the motorway network and have become prime destinations for national distribution depots. 
A well-publicized example, on the site of the former Shirebrook Colliery in Derbyshire, is the 
national warehouse of Sports Direct, where most of the workforce is employed on zero-hours 
contracts and low wages (see, e.g., he Guardian, 2015). Beyond the call centres and warehouses, 
growth in consumer spending has fuelled job growth in shops, hotels, pubs, restaurants and 
takeaways. Few of these new jobs are well paid, and many are part-time.
It is the weakness of labour demand in older industrial Britain, stripped of its once dominant 
employers, that has enabled the new employers to get away with paying low wages. he ex-min-
ers and ex-steelworkers may have baulked at the prospect of work in a call centre or warehouse 
and opted out of the labour market instead, cushioned by redundancy pay, early entitlement to 
pensions and disability beneits, but their sons and daughters have never faced the same choices 
(Alcock, Beatty, Fothergill, Macmillan, & Yeandle, 2003; Beatty, Fothergill, Houston, Powell, 
& Sissons, 2009a). With little possibility of remaining on JSA for long periods they have had 
to accept whatever work they can ind, particularly as some employers have been quick to turn 
to migrant workers from Eastern Europe as an alternative supply of low-wage labour (Dench, 
Hurstield, Hill, & Akroyd, 2006).
Women’s growing involvement in the labour market adds a further twist (Beatty et al., 2009b). 
In the places once dominated by heavy industry the tradition used to be that male wages supported 
whole families. Relatively few women with children held paid employment, especially on a full-
time basis. hat more women in these places now look for paid employment should be welcome 
progress but they do so in some of the most problematic labour markets in the country. Local 
economies have to grow very fast indeed if they are to not only replace the jobs that have been 
lost but also keep up with new labour supply. In practice, the growth has been insuicient and 
the result has been worklessness, part-time employment and low wages.
All this has further knock-on consequences for the Exchequer. Low wages generate low tax 
returns. But at least as importantly, low wages generate a high bill for in-work beneits. hese 
beneits include the following:
•  Housing Beneit.
•  Child Tax Credit.
•  Working Tax Credit.
Spending on in-work beneits is concentrated in the places where low wages are prevalent and (in 
the case of Housing Beneit) where housing costs are high. To illustrate this point, Figure 6 shows 
the estimated spending on Tax Credits, per adult of working age, in every local authority district 
across Britain.5 his presents a complex picture which is by no means a case of older industrial 
Britain versus the rest. Wherever low wages are the norm, spending on Tax Credits is high. his 
applies in a number of rural areas, in several seaside towns and in the parts of London where 
less well-of residents are concentrated. But it also applies across most of older industrial Britain.
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Figure 6. Estimated annual spending on Tax Credits by district. Sources: HMRC (2016), ONS 
(2017).
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he overlap with the maps shown earlier for job loss and disability beneits is considerable. 
In Middlesbrough, the estimated spending on Tax Credits works out at £1,050 a year per adult 
of working age. In Stoke-on-Trent it is £1,000. Across most of older industrial Britain, in fact, it 
exceeds £850. he equivalent igure in Guildford in Surrey is just £290 a year, and in Kensington 
and Chelsea is £310.
So job destruction in older industrial Britain has resulted not only in higher spending on out-
of-work beneits but also higher spending on in-work beneits and depressed tax revenue. It is 
impossible to put a reliable igure on the cost in terms of in-work beneits and lost tax revenue. 
However, Tax Credits paid to in-work households cost the Exchequer almost £20 billion a year6 
and Housing Beneit to in-work households rather more than £5 billion a year. If low pay also 
means that the Treasury receives £1,000 a year less in tax from (say) ive million workers – one 
in six of the workforce – that would be a further £5 billion a year.7 Add these together and the 
Exchequer cost of low pay is perhaps £30 billion a year. Bearing in mind the prevalence of low pay 
across older industrial Britain, perhaps £10 billion a year might be attributed to the destruction 
of well-paid industrial jobs.
If we add this admittedly speculative igure to the earlier, more robust estimates for the costs 
of ESA and JSA claims, the present-day cost to the Exchequer, in welfare payments and lost tax 
revenue, of the destruction of jobs in industrial Britain almost certainly exceeds £20 billion a year.
Lower output, lower incomes
here is a inal way in which the destruction of industry has undermined public inances. his is 
through the erosion of the UK’s export base, and this is arguably the most powerful efect of all. 
his is not something our research has addressed but it would be wrong to overlook.
he UK economy in 2017 seems remarkably prosperous. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
exceeds pre-inancial crisis levels and overall employment has reached record highs. But the 
prosperity is deeply precarious, and not simply because of the uncertainties created by impending 
departure from the European Union (EU). he UK economy is characterized by an extraordinary 
level of household debt, an alarming trade deicit with the rest of the world and a public-sector 
budget deicit that remains large despite the most draconian austerity measures in modern times
hese features of the contemporary UK economy are deeply interrelated. In essence, Britain is 
living beyond its means. Consumption and living standards are being sustained not by incomes 
earned by trading with each other and the rest of the world, but by ever-rising debt and the sale 
of UK assets – companies, property, government bonds – to foreign investors.
hat debt has become the driver of UK economic growth is irst and foremost the result of 
the erosion of the UK’s industrial base. he UK no longer sells enough to the rest of the world to 
pay for what it imports and the UK manufacturing sector has become so hollowed out that even 
a substantial devaluation of sterling, such as occurred in the wake of the 2008 inancial crisis and 
more recently following the Brexit vote, no longer provides suicient stimulus to bring foreign 
trade back into balance.
Of course, the UK does not rely just on manufacturing to pay for imports. he economy has 
proved exceptionally good at selling services to the rest of the world – inance, legal, design, media, 
education and the rest – but this success has never been enough to ofset the industrial failures. 
he fact remains that around half the value of all UK exports still comes from manufacturing and 
that manufacturing, with just 10% of the UK workforce, sells as much to the rest of the world as 
the other 90% put together.
he point here is that contemporary public inances are undermined not only by the direct 
cost of welfare beneits in former industrial Britain but also by the inability of a weakened man-
ufacturing sector to deliver the sustainable growth that the UK economy so clearly needs.
Regional Studies, Regional Science  175
REGIONAL STUDIES, REGIONAL SCIENCE
THE ORTHODOX SOLUTION: WELFARE CUTS
Faced with a budget deicit that is high and has proved slow to bring down, successive govern-
ments have chosen to tackle the symptoms rather than the underlying causes. A key symptom has 
been the high spending on working-age welfare beneits. As we have argued, this should really be 
understood as a result of economic failure rather than of inancial generosity. his is not, however, 
how the Treasury has interpreted the problem.
he pre-2010 Labour Government was far from immune to Treasury orthodoxy and from 
2008 onwards began to replace old-style incapacity beneits by ESA, with a new medical test and 
greater conditionality. he Coalition Government that then took oice introduced a major round 
of cuts to welfare beneits and its wholly Conservative successor, elected in 2015, has carried on 
with a further major round.
A distinguishing feature of the welfare reforms is that they focus almost exclusively on work-
ing-age claimants. By contrast, spending on state pensions – by far the largest component of wel-
fare spending – has been entirely unafected. he quite explicit assumption has been that reductions 
in working-age beneits incentivize claimants to ind work. By targeting in-work beneits as well, 
the reforms also assume that reduced entitlement will encourage claimants to ind a better-paid 
job or work longer hours. All this has been backed up by increasing conditionality and the wider 
application of sanctions. To put this another way, the assumption framing welfare policy is that 
unemployment and low pay are the fault of individuals. Claimants have let themselves become 
‘dependent’ on welfare beneits and they should choose to ‘do the right thing’ and instead ind 
work or increase their earnings.8
his is a quite diferent view to the one set out here, which is that high spending on welfare 
beneits is the result of economic failure. he Treasury’s orthodoxy makes the mistake of taking 
welfare spending out of its economic context. If the Treasury had a better understanding of what 
has happened to the economy of older industrial Britain it might not be so keen to blame welfare 
spending on the workshy or feckless.
We irst documented the uneven impact of the welfare reforms in a 2013 report (Beatty & 
Fothergill, 2013). An updated report calculated that by March 2016 the reforms had resulted in a 
loss to claimants of £14.5 billion a year (Beatty & Fothergill, 2016b). he Treasury’s own igures 
show that the reforms now in the pipeline will result in a further loss of £12.3 billion a year by 
2020/21.9 hat brings the cumulative total to almost £27 billion a year.
Figure 7 shows where across Britain this inancial loss is occurring.10 he methods under-
pinning these estimates are set out in our 2016 report. In essence, they take the Treasury’s own 
estimates of the inancial loss and translate them down to the local level using a range of oicial 
statistics on claimant numbers and spending. he measure shown in this map is the average loss 
per adult of working age – in other words, the inancial loss spread across all 16–64 year olds, 
including those not in receipt of welfare beneits. his is the best measure of the intensity of the 
‘hit’ in each place. he map shows the annual loss that can now be expected by 2020/21 as a result 
of all the post-2010 welfare reforms.
If this map shows similarities with those presented earlier it is not accidental. Welfare cuts 
inevitably impact most in the places where claimants are concentrated. herefore it is no surprise 
that Britain’s older industrial areas igure so prominently among the worst-hit places. Once more, 
it is places such as South Wales, the industrial North from Merseyside across to the Humber, 
North East England and the West of Scotland that stand out, whilst large parts of southern 
England around London are much less afected.
In Middlesbrough by 2020/21, the inancial loss from all of the post-2010 welfare reforms is 
estimated to exceed £1,000 a year per adult of working age. For those actually in receipt of welfare 
beneits the average inancial loss will obviously be larger – sometimes much larger. In Bradford 
the average loss per working age adult is £970 a year, in Oldham £950 a year and in Merthyr 
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Figure 7. Anticipated loss by 2020/21 arising from all post-2010 welfare reforms, by district. 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data.
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Tydil in the heart of the Welsh Valleys £920 a year. Across most of older industrial Britain the 
loss exceeds £750 a year. In Cambridge the equivalent igure is just £340 a year.
In fairness, older industrial Britain is not the only place hit hard by welfare reform. A number 
of less prosperous seaside towns are also hit hard, and a number of low-wage rural areas. Some 
parts of London also lose large sums, particularly because of the reductions in support for housing 
costs. Nevertheless, it is not di cult to argue that communities in older industrial Britain now 
face punishment in the form of welfare cuts for the destruction wrought to their industrial base 
all those years ago.
IS THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE?
But if welfare cuts represent the orthodox Treasury-driven response to the budget deicit, is there 
an alternative? Two principles should perhaps be central.
First, the rhetoric about rebalancing the UK economy needs to be turned into reality. In the 
wake of the 2008 inancial crisis there was much talk about the need to move away from an 
over-reliance on inancial services towards an economy based more on exports and investment. 
his did not happen. If anything, the UK economy became more imbalanced as growth returned 
because the old model based on debt and the housing market was rekindled one more time. At 
irst sight, the proposed new industrial strategy (HM Government, 2017) seems insuicient to 
mark a turning point.
A genuine revival in industrial production would be central to any rebalancing of the UK 
economy. It is salutary to remember that in Germany, where labour costs are generally at least as 
high as in the UK, the share of GDP accounted for by manufacturing is twice the level in the UK. 
In no small part as a result, Germany has a large trade surplus and a far smaller budget deicit. A 
rebalancing of the UK economy in favour of industry would be of direct beneit to much of older 
industrial Britain because, even after years of job loss, that is where so much of what remains of 
UK manufacturing is still located.
he other principle central to an alternative to the Treasury’s welfare cuts is a revival of regional 
economic policy. he places where welfare claimants are concentrated, out of work or on low 
wages, need to be grown fastest. At the present time, the UK probably has its weakest regional 
economic policies since the Second World War. In England, for example, the well-funded Regional 
Development Agencies were abolished in 2012 and the Regional Growth Fund, which co-inanced 
business investment in less prosperous areas, closed to new business in 2015. Looking ahead, the 
UK’s impending departure from the EU threatens to weaken regional policy still further if there 
is no replacement for the inancial support from the EU Structural Funds.
Indeed, what masquerades as UK regional policy is more often the promotion of competition 
between places, which in practice often widens the diferences in economic well-being, or the 
devolution of powers to local authorities, which is really about governance and has the most 
tenuous connection to prosperity. he dominating position of London, in particular, has gone 
unchallenged and London’s economy has pulled still further away from the rest of the country 
even though the downsides of the capital’s success – congestion and high property prices – are 
all too evident.
he starting point needs to be that the economies of older industrial Britain can be rebuilt. 
he prize is lower spending on welfare, higher tax revenue and a reduction in the budget deicit 
that is not based upon hitting the poorest place hardest.
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LESSONS FOR ANALYSIS AND POLICY
In conclusion, let us return to the theme at the very start of this article: that the focus on the 
short term obscures longer-term issues and trends. We have endeavoured to explain here how 
the destruction of industrial Britain in the 1980s still has profound repercussions for present-day 
public inances. What does this tell us about the way policy-makers and researchers should go 
about understanding issues, in Britain in particular but also perhaps in other mature economies 
where there has been profound and unevenly concentrated deindustrialization?
First and most obviously, it underlines the importance of a long-term perspective. Where we 
are now, as a society, is the product of long and still evolving economic processes. he inancial 
crisis of 2008 is not the deining event in Britain’s recent economic history, or even the main 
cause of the present budget deicit. he source of many current problems lies much deeper in the 
destruction of Britain’s industrial base and all that has lowed from it.
Second, it is hard to understand what is happening to the economy or society without looking 
at the diferences between places. It is disturbing that the Treasury and most of the economics 
profession rarely, if ever, look beyond national data and national trends. hey end up failing to 
grasp causality and misdiagnose problems.
hird, there is a pressing need to stop thinking in silos. Jobs, or the lack of them, and public 
inances are profoundly interconnected. Allowing Britain’s industrial base to wither so dramat-
ically has not been costless and it has certainly not been absorbed by the smooth operation of 
market forces. It has resulted in persistent worklessness, low wages and an inlated welfare bill.
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NOTES
 1. GB data for the year to March 2016. Source: Oice for National Statistics (2017).
 2. he exceptions are Blackpool and Hastings, two seaside towns with ailing local economies.
 3. Source: DWP (2017).
 4. August 2016. ‘Older industrial Britain’ as deined in Industrial Communities Alliance (2015).
 5.  Based on the average payment per claimant in 2014/15 and the number of claimants in each 
local authority in April 2016. Source: HMRC (2016).
 6. Spending data for 2014/15. Source: HMRC (2016).
 7. Spending data for 2015/16. Source: DWP (2017).
 8. For examples of this language see Department for Work and Pensions (2015).
 9.  his is a revised igure taking into account new data published in Budget 2016 and difers 
from the igure published in Beatty and Fothergill (2016b).
10.  Figure 7 has been updated to incorporate revised Treasury estimates of the inancial losses, 
published in Budget 2016.
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